Language for thought? Response to de Villers & de Villers

de Villiers and de Villiers, in Language for Thought, articulate the view that language is prerequisite to thought and not merely an effect of it. They focus exclusively on the issue of false belief and our ability to reason and form explanations about them. Specifically, the acquisition of language is a necessary condition for the … Continue reading Language for thought? Response to de Villers & de Villers →

Category specific semantic deficits: implications for structure of conceptual knowledge

Cognitive psychology is well-known for attempting to use individual cognitive - and SPECIFIC - failures as catalysts for larger discussions about the structure of processes critical to human rational thinking. Attached is a power point presentation I created as an undergraduate after reviewing numerous case studies. It summarizes my own commentary re: both the case studies per … Continue reading Category specific semantic deficits: implications for structure of conceptual knowledge →

A Glucagon inflation rate for type 1 diabetics?

Duration of Type I Diabetes Affects Glucagon and Glucose Responses to Insulin-Induced Hypoglycemia

Systems Analysis: example of DDT

Deliverable definition tables are easy to create and are very useful for representing the mapping human resources to deliverables. Here’s an example DDT from a group project I was apart of in graduate school. Deliverable Definition Table The following table lists the deliverable for the project, with classifications and resources required for each: … Continue reading Systems Analysis: example of DDT →

Intentional Inexistence, Intentional Objects, and the "Relational Nature of Singular Thoughts"

A discussion of intentionality, at least in philosophy, usually involves a reference to the work of Franz Brentano or Edmund Husserl and an accompanying description indicating that it is a philosophical term that signifies the 'aboutness' or "directedness" of mental states like thinking, wishing, remembering et cetera. Of course that captures some of what "intentionality" … Continue reading Intentional Inexistence, Intentional Objects, and the "Relational Nature of Singular Thoughts" →

Personal notes/commentary: “CVS: The Web Strategy.” Harvard Business School 9-500-008 (Rev. February 2, 2001)

CVS’s 1999 acquisition and subsequent launch of its online pharmacy service marked a significant moment for web-based distribution of the heavily regulated pharmaceutical industry. Here are a few notes and/or quotes I was drawn to while studying Harvard Business School’s famous case study of CVS’s first steps into web-based pharmaceutical distribution (as a major … Continue reading Personal notes/commentary: “CVS: The Web Strategy.” Harvard Business School 9-500-008 (Rev. February 2, 2001) →

Lehrer’s Epistemic Justification and the Appropriateness of Acceptance

del.icio.us Tags: epistemology,philosophy of mind,epistemic justification,scepticism,coherence theory of truth,Keith Lehrer,intentional content Presented in April 2007 at the Goucher College Philosophy Conference (VERITAS) w/keynote speaker John Carvalho, Villanova University Abstract: In this paper I treat Keith Lehrer’s characterization of knowledge and epistemic justification as presented “Knowledge, Scepticism, and Coherence.” (1999) In doing so, I delineate … Continue reading Lehrer’s Epistemic Justification and the Appropriateness of Acceptance →

For Wittgenstein, what does it mean for two words have the same meaning?

An essential part of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is the idea that, in general, the meaning of a word is how it used. Moreover, "how a term is used" amounts to "how it's use is explained". One might say that such a position has problems of a familiar sort. Consider the following argument: 1. A and … Continue reading For Wittgenstein, what does it mean for two words have the same meaning? →