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Wittgenstein constructs a thought experiment involving the fictional concept “tove” in The Blue Book. The following are my notes from that particular section.
Thought Experiment 1:
Purpose: Explain “tove” by pointing to a pencil and saying “this is tove.”
Subremarks:
“This is tove” may be substituted with “this is called ‘tove’. That they may be substituted indicates the deficiency of the view that an ostensive definition predicates something of the defined.
Outcome:
The ostensive definition of “tove” can be interpreted to mean many things: (1st column=’interpretation’; 2nd column=’category of understanding’
| This is a pencil | Physical object |
| This is round | shape |
| This is one | Numeric identity |
| This is hard | phenomenology |
Wittgenstein reflects on the difference between two uses of the verb “to notice”:
“I have noticed the way A enters the room; he always sticks his head in before entering.” (Wittgenstein, Brown 160)
“I noticed the way A sits and smokes.”
The difference is this: in the latter case, there is no hint that the expression need be described in terms of “the way A enters the room…”.
I suppose we might say that the difference is this: in the first case, the use of “I have noticed x” requires an explanation of “the way ‘what was noticed’ was performed; in the second case, there is no such requirement and it is sufficient to merely posit the fact of “noticing”.
The grammatical distinction might be put this way:
1) to notice the way that
2) to notice that
Is there a significant difference between noticing that and noticing the way that p? Consider the following analogous case:
p: I notice that the lights were off.
q: I noticed the way that the lights were off.
P is more or less straightforward; by that I mean that it is easy to “picture” p. We can imagine someone noticing that the lights were off. P here could mean equally “I saw that the lights were off” or “I took note that the lights were off” or “I acknowledged that the lights were off” or more simply “The lights were off”.
Q is more complicated, apparently. Its inherent complexity can be pointed to via the “the way that”. What does it mean to notice the way that as opposed to merely noticing that? Q implies that the “noticing” is, in this case, more detailed, more focused, more able to pick up on subtleties. Think of the distinction between “noticing the blue color” vs. “noticing the way that the blue color was”. The latter implies a uniqueness that the former cannot give sense to as manifestly.
In any event, it’s no good to merely introduce the grammatical distinction noted here. Wittgenstein would not have us say that “in all cases, ‘to notice the way that’ lends a more subtle sense of the thing noticed than does to merely ‘notice that’”
Seeing as how philosophy is just so darn technical and formal these days, I think it’s reasonable if not essential for this sort of blog to contain a tutorial of sorts.
The dictionary is great, isn’t it:
Main Entry: 2tutorial
Function: noun
1 : a class conducted by a tutor for one student or a small number of students
2 : a paper, book, film, or computer program that provides practical information about a specific subject
I wonder if Merriam-Webster will be upset that my use of the term “tutorial” may not be consistent with their definition! See, I don’t think that philosophers can have a tutorial: philosophy doesn’t form a specific subject. I suppose that means that we can’t “provide practical information” 
Anyway, what I will try to do is this:
If I happen to use a word or concept in a very specific way, in a way that only academic philosophers (or those with experience in academic philosophy) would be familiar with (e.g. possible-world semantics) I will link that word to whatever explanation or description I have access to that might lend some sense for non-academic philosopher.
The link will take the reader to another post in the tutorial category of this site, and it will contain brief explanations and/or helpful links. Everything not written by yours truly (the more the merrier) will be noted. This might be a good opportunity for legitimate link-building.
By the way, please don’t think that when I say “non-academic philosopher” I mean it in some derogatory way. If I’m truly a fan of Wittgenstein, and I am, I would know that Wittgenstein was famous for beginning classes with something like the following:
“if you are serious about philosophy and intend to teach it, then leave my class”
Anyway, the philosophical tutorial will characterize various and remote notions, from cyborg feminism to modal logic. Anyone with any experience about a manifestly remote topic should contact me about contributing to this section of the site. I’m getting more visitors these days, and some of them are bound to be cyborgs, if not social naturalists! See–this is why the philosophical tutorials section will come in handy.
So yeah, this will take a few weeks to implement, but be on the lookout.
Earlier I made a post about the distinction between explanation and description as it relates to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Upon rereading that post, I realize now that part it is misleading. Towards the end of the post I said:
Description seems theoretically innocent, merely observational for the sake of looking [call the italicized r]…explanation seems rigid, logical, rule-bound and systematic. The former opens the possibility of examing the meaning of a term in a new way, whereas the latter considers all such instances to be merely anomalous.
A lot of that paragraph is misleading, but I want to direct my critical attention to the italicized text.
p: “to describe” in the expression: “philosophers should describe, not explain meaning” is analogous to q: “the sense of ‘to describe’ as distinct from ‘to explain’ with regard to the former’s passivity relative to the latter’s“
q should be taken as my own interpretation of what I actually said.
It might be said that initially I liked r as a way to get at the semantic play (that is, ongoing exhange, or tug) between Wittgenstein’s sense of philosophical description and his sense of philosophical explanation. Then I realized r implied q, or was consistent with it enough to make me think that I wasn’t thinking about the difference between Wittgenstein’s use of “description” and his use of “explanation” but rather “description as a more passive and unassuming way to resolve linguistic difficulties”
Anyway, I’m glad I cleared that up.
I realized something yesterday while browsing at Barnes and Noble: for being so interested in Wittgenstein, I know little about his life, what sort of person he was to his friends/peers/colleagues, or what his mind might have been occupied with when it wasn’t too busy attending to philosophical problems and/or language games.
I looked at a Wittgenstein biography for probably the first time yesterday, too. Now, before moving on, let me point out that had I started out the post with:
p: I realized yesterday while at Barnes and Noble that I hadn’t ever read a Wittgenstein biography, so I decided to pick one up.
Then it would have seemed that the realization (that I hadn’t known much about Wittgenstein (the actual person)) somehow caused, or was an intention of the expressed action of actually viewing a Wittgenstein biography.
Now, getting back to the biography–yes, it’s stellar. I am referring now to Ray Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius
Monk apparently had a lot of access to Wittgenstein’s personal writings. Appropriately, Ludwig’s personal writings, which seemed to be mostly about his failing–and to some extent, delusional–romances, did little to give sense to his philosophical concerns. More significant, however, is the sort of person they illustrated: a cynical, depressed, but often witty individual who also didn’t exactly reserve his sense of philosophical pride.
That is to say, Wittgenstein knew what others thought about him, why they did, and above all else, Wittgenstein seemed(at least later in life, according to my interpretation of the provided personal writings) to have little doubt that he was a ‘true’ philosopher and that academia could go to hell.
Of particular interest to me was Monk’s commentary on the failing relationship between Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein. Despite the fact that Wittgenstein came to appall Russell’s popular writings (e.g. those that he wrote while studying in America during the 1940’s), he never lost a sense of respect for Russell’s capacity for logical reasoning. Russell also seemed to maintain respect for Wittgenstein’s logical insights.
Anyway, clearly I did not read a majority of the book, for had that been the case, I would have probably mentioned the circumstances of his death (well, I know some of the basics) and/or the sort of life he led while he came to articulate and expand on key philosphical insights.
AND GO RANT, GO (if you are particulary offended by spontaneous rants about interpretations of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that pack little in the way of textual citations, then continue to read on assuming that’s what you want to do!)
Then again, I suppose I may have been a bit tired of summarized information about his philosophical attitude(s): Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (I qualify with “later” because I don’t feel exactly qualified to comment on his earlier philosophy–I adore the logical integrity of the Tractatacus but haven’t spent enough time with it) is better appreciated through primary (not secondary) resources.
One of these days I’ll take the time to dig up some of my own notes about the bizarre, if not grossly convenient or”straightforward” reconstructions of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (i.e. anything after the realization that “we play games with language”) provided by analytic and post-analytic thinkers. When I say “grossly convenient” I mean providing an interpretation that explicitly coheres with some philosophical remark being argued for by the interpretor. Off the top of my head, it might go like this:
1. We should think about language and meaning in terms of social naturalism, because social naturalism is true, or useful, or something akin to either true or useful.
2. Oh, and see here’s a passage of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (note: it would most likely be one of the top 20 most quoted passages of the PI) that is consistent with social naturalism (further note: “consistent with social naturalism” would mean here “the quoted passage constains the words “natural” or “social” and the relevant terms of expressed in a way intelligible to the theory “social naturalism” as explicated by the author)
Anyway, I’m sure I’m being too harsh. I just don’t think that its at all helpful to say something like:
Wittgenstein was a social naturalist because he thought language, meaning, and intentionality were determined via social forces.
In an uninsightful way, I suppose that much is intelligible if not (to some extent) true. But you could say also that “President Bush is not a proponent of continental philosophy because he said he doesn’t appreciate history for fear of the effect of “knowing” history: it would change his policy/mind about things he doesn’t want to change.”
The analogy, while obviously bizarre, is meant to express the fact that in both cases, the interpretation is providing an intention to a thinker in virtue of the convenient use of a term. In the first, the term is “social naturalism” while in the second, the term is “continental philosophy”. Social naturalism could be explained in many, many, ways depending on how one is accustomed to the use of the term, and the same is DEFINITELY true of the term “continental philosophy” (e.g. the term “continental philosophy” means something VERY different to “analytic” philosophers as compared to “non-analytic” philosophers–it’s a political matter that many students of philosophy are completely naive of, so I won’t go into it here).
END RANT
I spontaneously decided to end my rant because I have grossly expired the time I intended to expend on this pursuit!
Haha, anyway, moral of the post: if you want a really interesting and well-informed biography about the Life (in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term) of Mr. Wittgenstein, in particular his delusional romances and overly-critical (but quite hilarious) autobiographical ramblings about his peers (in particular, Russell and Mill’s wife) then definitely check it out.
Disclaimer: no, I’m neither an amazon affiliate nor a barnes and noble affiliate (assuming the latter is actually possible…I’m assuming it is!)
I’d like to partake in a bit of an exercise.
The exercise will consist in describing the sorts of language games that go on in the world of warcraft while considering the use of “I” and “my character” from users of that game. Basically, I want to try to apply the later Wittgenstein’s “descriptive” approach to meaning, whereby he questions standard explications of the meaning of philosophically-heavy ideas, such as the idea that “the ‘I’ refers to the self of the person uttering it”. A related or analogous idea could be: if I’m in a state of pain, only I can feel it.
We might begin with a question like “when does the I not refer to the person who is using it and meaning it to refer to himself?”
In the context of an online world like world of warcraft, does someone’s vocal expression “Ah, I was killed by that monster, too.” fit with the ‘normal’ sense of “I”?
Wittgenstein might say something like: well, it depends on how one wants to determine the conditions under which we appropriately use “I” in different contexts. In one sense, the example above violates the standard sense of the “I” as denoting the being who speaks it/expresses it since it is possible to distinguish in this case between the user of the virtual character and the character itself.
Would it make more sense to say, “Ah, my character was killed by that monster, too.” I don’t think Wittgenstein would so easily subscribe to the view that in all cases, the latter is more or less precise than the former. Also, when and if we look at the actual use of the word, we might find that the former is used more often in the context of a game world. Doesn’t that warrant us taking another perspective regarding the grammatical function of the “I”?
Consider, again:
P: I was killed by that monster, too.
Q: My character was killed by that monster, too.
Couldn’t one say that the function of the “I” in P was grammatically equivalent to the function of the “my character” in Q? Perhaps–in one sense, we might say that “I” and “My character” both refer to a virtual entity being played/controlled by a real person. Of course, if we say that we’re assuming that the use of either expression makes sense only if it the distinction between virtual (in the sense of simulated) and real (in the sense of ‘outside world) obtains.
The relevant thing to realize is that it is not at all necessary for one to make sense out of P that he or she subscribes to the belief that the use of P is somehow contingent on a presupposition that the virtual world within which the character exists is categorically distinct from the real world within which the controller or “player” exists. But talking like this is like talking about shadows of reality-something Wittgenstein’s descriptive method clearly opposes.
The following is a quick list of major ideas Wittgenstein concerns himself with in The Blue and Brown Books. At some point, I’d like to write up a sort of lexicon or dictionary of Wittgenstein’s favorite terms, so this could have some use later on and I’d love some feedback from you readers as well.
- 1. The notion of recognizing something as something else—how or why do things make themselves present to our minds in this rather than that way? Why do I recognize what I point to as a game of chess, despite the fact that two pawns are missing?
- 2. Language as a grammatical system and language as something else entirely
- 3. The meaning of “to mean”
- 4. Explanation vs. Description
- 5. Ostensive vs. Verbal definition (pointing/asserting an example of x vs. coming to know how it is that x is an example of y)
- 6. grammatical distinctions as a ploy for common use of a term
- 7. Distinct senses of locality-mind vs physical locality, pain
- 8. to know a pain
- 9. sense vs. ‘not knowing how to go on’—in some instances, Wittgenstein seems to portray the sense of a term as the way in which we explain it—it is here that we feel “at home”–that is, the term no longer produces in us a sort of tension.
So, if you would like to respond, ask yourself “what are the major themes and/or ideas being dealt with here?” Please limit the scope of that question to your primary reading: Wittgenstein is notoriously difficult to interpret, but its important to develop your own geography when it comes to locating and giving context to his sometimes simple but fleeing accusations. I say simple because in terms of syntax and semantics, Wittgenstein is not at all that hard (he’s no Kant, if you get my drift), but what exactly he means, or if he means anything at all, is a more complicated issue.
Lastly, please excuse my recent deficit in activity. I’ve been swamped with trying to get myself going for graduate school, and moving cities, and figure out money, that Wittgenstein’s philosophy just wasn’t immediate enough a concern. This blog is a concern for me though, and I’ll do my best to post at least once a week, and respond promptly to your comments.
David