Now on to negative assertions and Plato
My interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of negative assertions (or “not-being) in the Sophist at (roughly) 257e
Plato’s doctrine of negative assertions:
Stranger: May we not say that the existence of the not-beautiful is constituted by its being marked off from a single definite kind among existing things and again set in contrast with something that exists?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Stranger: So it appears that the not-beautiful is an instance of something that exists being set in contrast to something that exists.
Theaetetus: Perfectly.
Stranger: What then? On this showing has the not-beautiful any less claim than the beautiful to be a thing that exists?
Theaetetus: Just as much
Stranger: And we must also put the not-just on the same footing as the just with respect to the fact that the one exists no less than the other.
The existence of the not-A (the form not-A?) is constituted
(a) by its being separated from a single (definite) Form among existing things (particulars)
AND
(b) by its being separated from something that exists (form or particular??)
If and only if not-A then (p) A is distinguishable from a single definite form F among existing F-particulars and (q) A is distinguishable from other non-F particulars and/or non-F forms
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Self-description is self-indulgence
About Me:
Let’s see, general stuff first I suppose: I’m a 23 year old graduate student studying to get my M.S. in information technology with a specialization in e-business. I’m a part-time freelance writer and web developer, although amateur in these respects.
My stint with philosophy
I studied philosophy and graduated cum laude and with honors from Goucher College with a B.A. back in May 2007. Some of my areas of interest included: epistemology, logic (including modal logics and possible-world semantics), feminist epistemology, philosophy of science (in particular, Kuhnian philosophy of science), feminist philosophy of science, philosophy of language (particularly 20th century analytic and post-analytic philosophy of language), and philosophy of mind (particularly 20th century analytic and post-analytic philosophy of language).
Then there’s Wittgenstein. I started reading Wittgenstein’s middle to later works (i.e. post 1929) during my senior year at Goucher College. I was put under that Wittgenstein trance; the one that’s so easy to fall into. I noticed myself kind of emulating him when writing papers. That probably wasn’t a good thing.
In any event, my “faith” in the systematic approach to philosophizing was shaken somewhat by realizations I had experienced while reading Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Grammar. These realizations motivated in me an opposition to 20th century Anglo-American accounts of language and meaning, in particular some of the same topics I had, only a few years prior, so happily embraced. Soon it made no sense to talk about propositions and meaning as a function of some mapping from intensions to extensions (Chalmers).
My senior thesis quickly found use for Wittgenstein’s playful attempt at dissolving our philosophical confusions; by the end, it turned into an epic 70+ page presentation and subsequent critique of 20th century efforts to come to grips with the issues Brentano is credited with motivating in his notion of intentionality. I’ve got many posts on this topic, as you can see from the list of categories here.
Current life developments
After a brief stint in a graduate program for psychology (my minor in undergraduate was cognitive psychology) I switched fields and am now studying information technology. I had seriously considered graduate school but found the competition and the somewhat career options for a PhD in philosophy somewhat restricting.
To my surprise, I never stopped the kind of thinking that was developed during my four years as an undergraduate. I still assess arguments deductively. I still use Wittgensteinian-like exclamations in response to something I find ridiculous in whatever it is I’m reading. Such instances are usually motivated by a certain playful sarcasm that my time with Wittgenstein’s philosophy could not fail but instill in me.
Looking back at my old papers and older posts on this blog, I can’t say that I agree with everything I wrote. But I look at these things developmentally and so I don’t think of such departures as instances of inconsistency. We can change our minds, you know, and I think philosophers, in particular those clinging to some bizarre conception of philosophy as a science, or as a foundation for science, are apt to forget that.
If you want to know more about me, feel free to shoot me an email at dprice218@gmail.com
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