“Language Games”: Blue vs. Brown

It really is amazing how much different Wittgenstein’s conception of language games appears once you step back and consider a description of language games from The Blue Book vs one from The Brown Book.

Here’s one I like from the Blue Book:

“I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language games.  These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language.  Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words.  The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages.  If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought.” (Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 17)

This description makes it seem that Wittgenstein is proposing a research program into various aspects of language.  In fact, I must note the affinity between this way of talking about language, that is, with recourse to “forms of thinking” (from this view, language must answer to thought–language is the vehicle of expression for thought), and contemporary discourse on linguistic processes present within the cognitive and linguistic sciences.  Notice also that how the use of the term “language games” is coordinated with the notion of simpler, more basic and/or elementary forms of language.  Later on, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that any language game is really more or less basic than other language games.

Lastly, I was surprised at Wittgenstein’s attitude towards the kinds of standard protocols characterized by a Cartesian or Lockean epistemology.  Was Wittgenstein still in the clutch of traditional western epistemology here?  Does he intend, or did he intend, to really use ‘language games’–here as more primitive forms of language–as a way to answer questions about the nature of truth and falsehood?  Would we say that he’s exercising a sort of representational theory of meaning, and thus a correspondence theory of truth?  I’m not so sure, but it certainly ought to make you aware of something: even in this “later” period, Wittgenstein may not have totally grasped the implications of seeing language and meaning as an activity.

Now let’s look at a description of language games present in the later work, The Brown Book:

“Systems of communication as for instance 1), 2), 3), 4), 5), we shall call “language games”.  Children are taught their native language by means of such games,  [Notice--this position is not altogether consistent with most contemporary theories of cognitive development whereby infants learn the meaning of words via being able to represent what the word(s) denote] and here they even have the entertaining character of games.  We are not, however,regarding the language games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete in themselves, as complete systems of human communication.  To keep this point of view in mind, it very often is useful to imagine such a simple language to be the entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society.  Think of primitive arithmetics of such tribes.” (Wittgenstein, Brown Book, 81)

Well, clearly this description lends itself to a very different kind of interpretation.  Here, language games are not conceived as more or less simple versions of ‘real’ “everyday” language.  On the contrary, language games are considered as complete systems of language.

Wittgenstein needs to be careful here, though.  It is quite easy to take “language games are complete systems of language” as meaning that a particular language game is complete in the sense of operating on quite independent syntactic and semantic rules such that the ‘meaning’ of an expression within that particular game need not be interpreted further.  Wittgenstein shouldn’t be read here as saying that, in all cases for p within language game S, p need not be further interpreted by speakers of language game S.  The possibility ought to remain, even with a “complete system of language” for any p to be ‘given a new sense’/interpretation.

To sum up: the completeness of system of language does not guarantee that any expression within that system is immune to interpretation.

But to go back to my main point, here clearly Wittgenstein’s intentions are quite different as compared to his somewhat epistemic intentions implied by his description of language games in the Blue Books.  If you’re interested in Wittgenstein’s development from the Blue to the Brown Books, consult Rush Rhees’ forward to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books of which Rush is translator.  Rhees takes a different approach to this kind of discussion, but it is quite enlightening and highly recommended none the less.

Philosophical Investigations online

If you don’t mind commentary, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (courtesy of Lois Shawyer) is available freely online at http://users.rcn.com/rathbone/lwtocc.htm

I only checked out the first 10 aphorisms, but if the first 10 are at all representative of the rest of the publication, then kudos to Shawyer for providing such a great service.  Shawyer’s introductory remarks indicating what Wittgenstein is like to the untrained philosopher is insightful:

 The problem is that while Wittgenstein’s writing style is quite beautiful, almost poetic,  it is so unusual, that all of us, it seems, need a little help in the beginning.

I still need help! Though I suppose that that is part of the appeal of Wittgenstein’s philosophy–especially his later philosophy.  Its ordinariness (compared to other philosophers) makes it bizarre to interpret–though reading it is easy enough.  Where there is a lack of need to look up terminology with a specific sense within the discourse of philosophy, there is a more pressing need to disentangle several points of view from the issues being only hinted at.

Tension in early-Wittgenstein’s critique of set theory

I was doing some light reading this morning and I learned that Wittgenstein’s critique of the intension/extensional distinction begins in his early periods.  I find that fascinating since, together with his critique of Russell’s philosophy of mathematics in the Tractatus, there seems to be a tension that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy does a much better job of explaining–sorry, I don’t have sufficient expertise in his early period to warrant an attempt

If you’re interested, check out the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, by Victor Rodych.

(source: Rodych, Victor, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/>.)

Quine’s weak Whorfian hypothesis?

I am continuing to notice both implicit and explicit parallels between two different discourses: on the one hand, the philosophy of language/mind, and on the other, cognitive and psycholinguistics. Its eye-opening: I hadn’t been aware how influential many of the anglo-american philosophers I am familiar with were to other, non-philosophical discourses.

F. Xu, in The role of language in acquiring object kind concepts in infancy (Cognition, 85), showcases Quine’s influence on “theories of conceptual development in which language plays a crucial role.” (Xu, 224)  Quine’s view may be seen as a weaker Whorfian hypothesis to the extent that it holds cross-linguistic differences as corresponding to cognitive differences between groups. More importantly, apparently, is Quine’s regard to the ontological effect of such cross-linguistic differences.

“Quine…considered how language may be used to build our ontology.  Most widely discussed is the case of the conceptual distinction between objects and substances from the linguistic distinction of count/mass syntax.  Quine proposed that the infant’s world is profoundly different from ours for lack of representations of enduring objects, and that it is by learning the count/mass syntax of a natural language, e.g. English, that the infant is able to “boot-strap” herself into a more adult-like conceptual scheme.  On this view, [call what follows p] cross-linguistic differences result in profound conceptual differences in adults; e.g. speakers of Japanese, which lacks the count/mass distinction, would not represent the ontological distinction between individuated entities, such as objects, and non-individuated entities, such as substances. Furthermore, [call what follows q]children learning different languages would follow rather different developmental trajectories.” (Xu, 224)

Oddly, Xu goes on to imply that Quine’s view can be distinguished further: “Empirical investigations of this issue have found that the strong version of this view is wrong: even English-speaking children who have not mastered the count/mass syntax already differentiate objects from substances in extending word meanings.” (Xu, 224)

To be honest, I’m not entirely familiar with Quine’s theory of cognitive development.   I’m not entirely sure, either, of what the “strong” version of this account is–though I suspect it is the idea that “children learning different languages would follow rather different developmental trajectories.” (Xu, 224)

To review, the difference between the strong and weak Whorfian claim is allegedly that the former supports a “linguistic differences correspond to cognitive, non-linguistic differences in thought between groups” line of thought while the latter supports the lesser claim that certain KINDS of cognition, a “thinking for speaking” kind, might be influenced by linguistic effects.

The alleged distinction in Quine’s theory of cognitive development (i.e. that BOTH p and q) doesn’t parallel the strong/weak distinction in the context of Whorfian claims.  Unless someone else can offer another way to read Xu’s interpretation of Quine’s view, that is.

Wittgenstein’s subtle asserting? Discussion of Gendler’s piece.

E.T. Gendlin of University of Chicago has an interesting paper available online called What Happens When Wittgenstein Asks What Happens When…”? (you can view the article here)

I had originally found it when I was struggling to finish my senior thesis but recently I’ve reviewed it.  I must say that I very much respect Gendlin’s position regarding the issue of whether or not Wittgenstein asserted anything.  Many philosophers assert that Wittgenstein’s didn’t assert anything, that is, didn’t posit anything “as the case”.  I suppose that interpretation makes sense if the prior assumption, that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy flies very much in the face of traditional epistemology, was granted.

Gendlin, on the other hand, rightly points out that Wittgenstein DID assert something (in fact, many things).  Did Wittgenstein’s own grammar trick us into thinking he was really “showing” and not “asserting”?  The passage I’m referring to from Gendlin’s piece looks like this:

It is often said that Wittgenstein dispelled mistakes but did not assert anything. This is not quite so. He said that he could only show, but let us notice: He did assert that he could show. We also find him constantly asking questions and answering them with examples that involve quite affirmative statements. Let me call your attention to some characteristic phrases with which Wittgenstein asks and answers himself. (Gendlin, E.T. What Happens When Wittgenstein Asks What Happens When…”Philosophical Forum, XXVIII. 3, Spring 1997)

It’s a tricky issue, obviously.  The point is that it’s hard to pinpoint which, if any, perspective Wittgenstein actually took in a particular passage.  Sometimes he begins sentences with “I want to say that…” and I get the sense that he means that in the sense that “I want to say that I can afford dinner, but I really can’t.”  Other times, and you’ll have to forgive my lack of examples–PG and Blue/Brown Books aren’t within my reach–Wittgenstein’s use of that same expression makes it seem like he actually is saying such and such, and not merely “wanting to say” in the sense of “hoping” or “semi-intending”.

I appreciate how Gendlin sets up the central tension of the “showing” vs “asserting” problem.

If we talk about Wittgenstein’s showing, we exceed the bounds he set for himself, but if we do not, then we cannot make sense of his position. How to navigate between these two pitfalls is the problem. Rather than pretending to solve it, I will traverse the problem in very small increments, pausing at each juncture to examine exactly what in Wittgenstein we may have violated.

The problem with pursuing the matter “in very small increments” is that one loses the sense that there is a complete picture of Wittgenstein’s intent with respect to showing vs. asserting.  Perhaps at one point (i.e. in one language game) Wittgenstein really means what he says he is only showing (i.e. ‘means’ in the sense of ‘asserts’ or ‘thinks truly of’) while at another point, Wittgenstein’s use of that same clue might be to throw off the reader.  A third possibility is that, similar to the question of whether Plato would actually believe in the Theory of the Forms that is so characteristically attributed to him, the entire discussion of whether or not Wittgenstein actually did ‘posit something he took to be true ‘ is simply an impossible and/or inappropriate discussion.

In any event, I didn’t want this post to be too long, but there are other points I’d like to discuss from the Gendlin piece, so keep your eyes open.  And if anyone else has read it and would like to chime in, please do so.

One final thing I’d like to say for the record: Gendler > Searle with respect to “how one ought to go about discussing Wittgenstein”.  I’m sure the comparison isn’t fair, its just that I can’t get this one interpretation Searle uses of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy; it was in his piece called “Intentionality”, I think.  Anyway, Searle isn’t exactly as into Wittgenstein probably as much as I am, or Gendler (when he wrote it) so  don’t take that assertion (did I mean that as a joke in this context? not sure) TOO seriously.

Good thing the meaning of a name isn’t the thing the name points to

Well, today I noticed that a paper I wrote for a race relations class was published in my school’s undergraduate journal, VERGE.  If you’re interested in it, you can find it here http://www.goucher.edu/x20848.xml

Unfortunately there was a mistake such that the name that appears on the PDF document isn’t mine.  Doh. Two philosophical positions come to mind to remedy the situation:

1. epistemic fallibility
2. later-Wittgenstein on the meaning of a name

If I couldn’t take comfort with the entertainment of those two perspectives, I don’t know what I would do! 

Problems with testing the ‘linguistic relativity’ position

I’m currently enrolled in a course that has focused mostly on the linguistic relativity position as it exists in contemporary cognitive psychology (and to some extent, anthropology).

In a very basic sense, the linguistic relativity position says that the language a person uses determines how he or she thinks about the world in the sense that users of distinct linguistic communities actually encode (i.e. represent) the world (or an aspect of it) quite differently.

There are a number of problems characteristically cited in contemporary discussions that I’d like to review.  I’ll present these simply as obstacles to an objective treatment of this view.

• Significance of the way the instructions of a task are presented (especially relevant in bilingual and/or cross-linguistic experimental designs)
• Domain vs. Structural-centered approaches
• Cultural vs. Linguistic effects on cognition
• Population representation: the samples of these studies rarely (if ever) can be said to be representative of the “linguistic community” that they are purportedly members of
• Insufficient description and/or knowledge of cultural differences within a particular “linguistic community”

Another I’d like to add to the list is:

• Conflation and/or imprecise use of the term “language” and/or “linguistic community”

The latter could be rephrased as “issues concerning the projectability (in the sense that Nelson Goodman attributes to that term) of ‘linguistic effects’

To put it in a much better way: even if an experiment (and its interpretation) purport and do a good job of showing a correspondence between a linguistic difference and a cognitive difference between two communities, its uncertain whether the conclusion(s) is projectible to “language in general”–or, to emulate Heidegger’s treatment of ‘being vs. Being’–Language.

So for instance, let’s say that users of Language A actually do differ in their experience of ’space” (i.e. in their spatial cognition) as compared to users of Language B, does it then follow that

1. “linguistic relativity is true” because it was shown that members of one linguistic community manifested distinct cognitive patterns as compared to the cognitive patterns manifest for members of another linguistic community….OR
2. “linguistic relativity is true” because Language (i.e. “language itself”) determines the cognitive differences observed in different linguistic communities (that is, “different linguistic communities IN GENERAL” and not merely “differences among particular linguistic communities”)

Long story short is that depending on how a conclusion regarding the relationship between “language users” and “thought” (i.e. cognition of a nonlinguistic type) is projected, you’ll see very different takes on the “stakes” of the claim.  In the first case the cognitive difference is due to language-effects between one particular linguistic community and another particular linguistic community.  In the second case, the cognitive difference (i.e. the difference in thought) is taken to indicate a general effect of language itself, that is, Language…otherwise known as “the capacity for language”.

In a very short time observed cognitive differences between distinct linguistic communities becomes explainable via recourse to “the capacity for language”–a description in close proximity to something an advocate of Chomsky’s positions might say.  The irony is, of course, that proponents of the linguistic relativity position are OPPOSED to Chomsky’s program, to the whole edifice upon which the “universal grammar” conception is built.

LOL@ “Philosophical Tribulations”

Simon, over at Wittgensteinforum.wordpress.com, just posted a link to a hilarious application of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Here’s my response to it, available here (as in ‘below’) and here:

LOL

Wow, I had to share this with my gf, who knows nothing of philosophy (she’s a chemist) but nonetheless found it rather hilarious.

Its both sad and delightful that Wittgenstein’s method can be emulated in such “trivial” –but not disinteresting–ways.

I think the “I want to say, ARRRGGGGGHH” example sheds a lot of light on what the reader feels when reading Wittgenstein. Of course, the internalization of “ARRRRGGGGHHH” can be as exciting and motivating as it is an ‘expression of frustration’.

By the way, I want to amend my statement regarding my gf’s knowledge of philosophy.  Contrary to what I said originally, she DOES know something about philosophy, at least to the extent that I am constantly talking about her use of a word at one moment as compared to another shows how we ought not to think of ‘meaning’ as a function of the commonality of word-meanings but rather as the way those words can be used in various game-like contexts.

In any event, as my comment no doubt suggests, I probably reflected too much on the “philosophical” significance of the Philosophical Tribulations. 

Characteristics of voluntary and involuntary acts

In The Brown Book (p.152), Wittgenstein asks us to compare different cases of voluntary vs. involuntary acts. Wittgenstein describes cases in which the meaning of “voluntary act” as it might be expressed in a description of the case of “lifting a heavy weight” is characterized by an experience of effort.  The act of writing voluntarily, however, does not contain this sense of an experience of effort.  Thus whether or not effort is at all characteristic of the meaning of “voluntary act” (or volition in general) may or may not obtain in our actual cases–cases in which we ascribe a particular event as characterizing a “voluntary act”.  He goes on to describe an analagous case:

Further compare the lifting of your hand when you lift a weight with it with lifting your hand when, e.g., you point to some object above you.  This will certainly be regarded as a voluntary act, though the element of effort will most likely be entirely absent; in fact this raising of the arm to point to an object is very much like raising the eye to look at it, and here we can hardly conceive of an effort.  (Wittgenstein, Brown Book, 132-133)

While he does describe the sense of “voluntary act” in the case of lifting a heavy object, he does not positively characterize it with regard to “voluntarily pointing your finger” or “voluntarily writing”.

Do we use the expression “to point one’s finger” in a way that is absent or independent (or irrelevant) to the act being voluntary?  Don’t we usually use that expression as if the audience already knew it was voluntary?

“I can’t see where you’re pointing at.”

In that expression, the sense of “pointing” already appears voluntary.  The basis of the question rests partly on the fact that the subject does not share the intentional relation purported by his peer’s act of pointing; that is, the relation between the pointer and what’s being pointed at.  If asked “in what sense can you not see what I’m pointing at?” the original speaker may respond: “well, certainly I don’t mean that I am blind in the area that your act of pointing is intended to direct my attention”. The ‘failure to see’ here refers to the intended object, not the experience of a part of a visual field where the intended object ought to be seen.

Small world: Wittgenstein’s friend from my hometown

Apparently Rush Rhees, translator  and literary executor of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, was from my hometown of Rochester, NY.  I can’t imagine anyone from Rochester being Wittgenstein’s friend and student, let alone one of the critical factors in determining the publication of Wittgenstein’s originally unpublished work.

Small world after all