Description: a statement, picture in words, or account that describes; descriptive representation.

Explanation: something that explains; a statement made to clarify something and make it understandable; exposition: an explanation of a poem.

Description is simply that, a statement of facts, of what precisely happens. An explanation is a farther reaching attempt that ultimately must revert back to our core fascination with “Why?” We wish to know more about the reason behind what is happening.

For a very basic example let’s take the Washington DC area sniper. The description would be: “Two men began to snipe people secretively and at random, and the details are as follows…” The explanation would be an in depth psychoanalysis of their motivations and what led to them.

But what is especially interesting about the dichotomy I think and as Wittgenstein put it is that all explanation becomes description if we merely know the physicality… that is, religion and “magic” are explanations because they are rationalizations we use when we don’t have a full description. Ultimately, explaining the psychology behind the snipers is actually just another description, it’s just that because of the position we are in, that is, not having the ability to measure precisely which chemical-mental processes led to their actions, we must rely on an “explanation.”

I hope I’m fairly clear.

Einstein described the energy mass equivalency theory. What he could not do was tell us at the very core what the ramifications are. It is inherent in us to ask “Why?” and even “How? What is doing this?” Clearly, Einstein hit upon a truth inherent in the universe: when atoms are split this will cause a chain reaction. What more could he tell us? All he could do is describe the physical truth of the situation.

cheers, Cherry.

I do hope they post the paper, I’d be very interested to see it. The only paper I recall reading that explicitly dealt with Husserl and Wittgenstein re: intentionality was something called “Wittgenstein and the Snark” and then something about social naturalism. I have the paper but do not currently have access to it as I’m away from my desktop.

Good to see you’re back.

On Friday there was a talk given at the Wittgenstein Workshop comparing Wittgenstein and Husserl on intention and fulfillment. The paper wasn’t posted, but there are plans to post the audio soon. The Workshop’s address is: http://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/wittgenstein/

Ryskamp, John Henry, “Paradox, Natural Mathematics, Relativity and Twentieth-Century Ideas” (May 19, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=897085

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Relatedly, that page links to a paper titled “Whorf hypothesis is supported in the right visual field but not the left”, which looks very interesting, though I have not read it.

This site has the same, without commentary.

When does PI enter the public domain, anyway? I thought it wasn’t for a few years still, but a quick glance at Wikipedia notes that the “Life of the author+infinite years” thing only applies to certain works publishes before 1964.

Oh, good. A little work shows that its copyright was renewed, so I suppose it may very well be indefinitely copyrighted along with Mickey & the gang. I suppose “Fair Use”-sized selections is what the internet gets to work with for the foreseeable future. Ah, well.

I am sure Wittgenstein would have hated the expression ’school of philosophy’ being attributable to him. In the Preface of the Investigations, he mentions how his vanity was stung upon learning that the Blue and Brown Books were in circulation among his students at Cambridge. He appears overly sensitive about being imitated by others, which is why he would never have supported the founding of a school of philosophy in his name. Also, let’s not forget in this context his general disdain of academia.

Sincerely,

Simon