Philosophical Grammar, comment 98: intention/intentionality


98 The intention seems to interpret, to give the final interpretation.

Imagine an ‘abstract’ sign-language translated into an unambiguous picture-language.  Here there seem to be no further possibilities of interpretation. -We might say we didn’t enter into the sign-language but did enter into the painted picture.  Examples: picture, cinema, dream.

When the sign becomes the picture, it is an intention.

Here the meaning of a sign (that is not an intention) must include: ‘capable of additional interpretation’ but ‘significant’ and/or ‘noticeable’, such as a kind of marker or demarcation.  Something that can be described but that cannot or is not (presently, for instance) fully describable in the sense that its description, where possible, does not contain what is essential to it’s essential function (for a community of speakers, playing certain language game(s)), for instance.

We have the idea that the sign is translatable, just as we have the idea that one language may be translated into another.  They both stem from the deception that the meaning of a word is what is common to all its expressions, uses, referants, et cetera.

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