WITTGENSTEIN POSES A PROBLEM FOR THE MATHEMATICALLY CHALLENGED
I understand the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic, at least insofar as that term refers to his commentary on “the meaning of a proposition” and “logic” as a sort of grammar. I also understand his critiques of Fregean semantics, or am at least familiar enough with them that I could write a bit on it.
One thing that continues to evade my cognitive grasp, however, is the later Wittgenstein’s remarks on mathematics–for instance, his comments on probability statements, and on Ramsey’s equations.
I love logic, but I’m definitely not a math whiz (I think this serves as a counter-example to Russell’s idea that logic is foundational with respect to math; that is, mathematical statements could, in principle, be reduced into statements of logic), nor am I exactly familiar with Wittgenstein’s often bizarre notation (his notation for logical symbols used to throw me off).
A PROPOSITION FOR YOU MATH PEOPLE: I INTERVIEW YOU, YOU INTERVIEW (OR WHATEVER) ME
With that in mind, is anyone familiar with the sections of Philosophical Grammar where Wittgenstein devotes his philosophical eye to various problems in mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics? If so, please comment here, and summarize what you know and what you might consider writing about if asked by yours truly.
I’d love to work out a mutually beneficial arrangement, whereby I can interview anyone who is interested and/or knows this kind of stuff, and then you can interview me or whatever on your blog/website (note: your website or blog need not be particularly concerned with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, I’m open to several topics of discussion)