Language for thought? Response to de Villers & de Villers

de Villiers and de Villiers, in Language for Thought, articulate the view that language is prerequisite to thought and not merely an effect of it. They focus exclusively on the issue of false belief and our ability to reason and form explanations about them. Specifically, the acquisition of language is a necessary condition for the … Continue reading Language for thought? Response to de Villers & de Villers →

Intentional Inexistence, Intentional Objects, and the "Relational Nature of Singular Thoughts"

A discussion of intentionality, at least in philosophy, usually involves a reference to the work of Franz Brentano or Edmund Husserl and an accompanying description indicating that it is a philosophical term that signifies the 'aboutness' or "directedness" of mental states like thinking, wishing, remembering et cetera. Of course that captures some of what "intentionality" … Continue reading Intentional Inexistence, Intentional Objects, and the "Relational Nature of Singular Thoughts" →

Lehrer’s Epistemic Justification and the Appropriateness of Acceptance

del.icio.us Tags: epistemology,philosophy of mind,epistemic justification,scepticism,coherence theory of truth,Keith Lehrer,intentional content Presented in April 2007 at the Goucher College Philosophy Conference (VERITAS) w/keynote speaker John Carvalho, Villanova University Abstract: In this paper I treat Keith Lehrer’s characterization of knowledge and epistemic justification as presented “Knowledge, Scepticism, and Coherence.” (1999) In doing so, I delineate … Continue reading Lehrer’s Epistemic Justification and the Appropriateness of Acceptance →

The Duty of Genius

"We say that someone has the eye of a painter or the ear of a musician but anyone lacking these qualities hardly suffers from a kind of blindness or deafness." "We say that someone doesn't have a musical ear, and aspect-blindness is (in a way) comparable to this inability to hear." These are quoted from … Continue reading The Duty of Genius →

The emergence of an old problem: if there’s a problem with a reductio, what do you call it?

It's always fun to meet an old friend, even when "friend" means "difficulty". What do I call my problem with a reductio ad absurdum given that such "arguments" by definition are deductively invalid and thus not sound? A familiar problem in a new context.

Husserl on Expression and Meaning

Husserl on Expression and Meaning Content as object, content as fulfilling sense, and content as sense or meaning simpliciter “Relational talk of “intimation,” “meaning” and “object” belongs essentially to every expression. Every expression intimates something, means something and names or otherwise designates something. In each case, talk of “expression” is equivocal. As said above, relation … Continue reading Husserl on Expression and Meaning →

An (attempt) at explaining my thesis (and/or its motivation)

A (relatively) brief explanation of my senior thesis: The general topic of my thesis is intentionality. The standard way to introduce intentionality is to describe it in much the same way Franz Brentano did: it is a term that more or less stands for the ‘aboutness’ of folk-psychological states like remembering, perceiving, thinking, wishing, intending, … Continue reading An (attempt) at explaining my thesis (and/or its motivation) →

Wittgenstein: aspect-blindness

Nice tutorial on Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar

I'm a bit overwhelmed with finals and papers, but I did have a chance to read about half of Robert Wesley Angelo's tutorial on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. He provides a very user-friendly characterization of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar and more importantly, Wittgenstein's intention with his overall project. You can view it at http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/